Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical Gatekeeping by Pellegrino, Edmund D.
Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) 
Volume 2 Issue 1 Article 6 
1986 
Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical Gatekeeping 
Edmund D. Pellegrino 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp 
 Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Edmund D. Pellegrino, Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical Gatekeeping, 2 J. Contemp. Health L. 
& Pol'y 23 (1986). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp/vol2/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) by an authorized editor of CUA Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
RATIONING HEALTH CARE: THE ETHICS OF
MEDICAL GATEKEEPING
Edmund D. Pellegrino, M.D. *
I. INTRODUCTION
An ethically perilous line of reasoning is gaining wide currency in our
country today. It starts with a legitimate concern for rising health care
costs, finds them uncontrollable by any means except some form of ration-
ing, and concludes that the physician must become the "gatekeeper," the
designated guardian of society's resources. By negative and positive finan-
cial incentives it is reasoned, the physician can be forced to conserve tests,
treatments, operations, hospitalization, and referrals for consultation. In
this way, it is presumed, costs will be cut by the elimination of "unneces-
sary" medical care.
From an economic point of view this argument is attractive to those who
must shoulder a good part of our "more-than-a-billion-dollar-a-day" health
care bill. Policy makers, corporation executives, insurance carriers, affluent
patients, and some physicians have already accepted the economic inevitabil-
ity of rationing. The ethical implications are brushed aside as secondary
given the size of the problem and the fact that it is indeed the physician who
is responsible for seventy-five percent of all health care expenditures.
Before committing ourselves to a course of action that will drastically al-
ter the already strained trust relationships between patients and physicians,
some of the ethical questions in "gatekeeping" need closer examination. To
what extent can, or should, the physician serve simultaneously the needs of
his patients, his own interests, and those of society? To what extent should
the physician be a double, triple, or even quadruple agent? Under what con-
ditions would such divided advocacy be necessary, desirable, or morally
licit? What are the implications for our traditional understandings of medi-
cal ethics? How is the physician to resolve the conflicts of obligations built
into divided advocacies? What is society's responsibility for creating or ame-
liorating these conflicts? Are these legal issues as well?
* Director, Kennedy Institute of Ethics and John Carrol Professor of Medicine and
Medical Humanities, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
•* This article derives in part from the 1985 David Barap Brin Lecture, Johns Hopkins
University, Baltimore, Maryland, December, 1985.
24 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 2:23
I will argue that the line of reasoning that leads to rationing and physician
gatekeeping is morally unsound and factually suspect; that there are condi-
tions under which rationing might be morally justifiable, but they are not
met by current plans, and that, rather than enhance, we ought to minimize
physician self-interest as a motive in medical and health care provision.
I will start with an examination of the conflict of interest that is a de facto
aspect of physician-patient relationships, then define three kinds of "gate-
keeper" roles, the moral issues inherent in each, and the conditions for a
morally licit rationing system.
II. DE FACTO CONFLICT OF INTEREST
When the first physician requested a fee for his services, economics and
conflict of interest entered medicine.1 Ever since, the physician's fee and the
degree to which he could equate necessity for his services with maintaining
his own income have been sources of suspicion and contention between phy-
sicians and patients. Socrates was forced in his dialogue with the cynical
Thrasymachus to admit that the physician was engaged in two "arts"-the
art of medicine, which had as its end the health of the patient, and the "art"
of making money, which had the physician's self-interest as its end and
which did not, in itself, contribute to the patient's welfare at all.
Then isn't it the case that the doctor insofar as he is the doctor
considers or commands not the doctor's advantage but that of the
sick man? For the doctor in the precise sense was agreed to be a
ruler of bodies and not a money maker.2
Do you call the medical art the wage earner's art even if a man
practicing medicine should earn wages?3
The medical art produces health, the wage earner's art wages.4
Plato admitted, through Socrates, that these two arts could be in conflict,
indeed had to be, given their disparate ends. For a more modern version of
the fee dilemma, no one has more tellingly exposed the inevitability of a
certain amount of conflict of interest in the physician's work than George
Bernard Shaw.5
1. Fees for service - in goods, preferments, or money - are as old as medicine. Fees,
their level, problems in collection, and the like are found in many of the books of the Hippo-
cratic Corpus.
2. PLATO, REPUBLIC 1342d.
3. Id. at 346b.
4. Id. at 346d.
5. G. SHAW, THE DOCTOR's DILEMMA. Note especially the acerbic but, sadly, too
often accurate, "Preface on Doctors."
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This defacto conflict of interest is difficult or impossible to eliminate given
the fact that physicians must earn a living, support families, and have access
to the same material goods as others. What mitigates the conflict is the ethi-
cal commitment of the physician to the patient's good, i.e., to the principle of
beneficence. This has been the central principle of medical ethics. It is im-
plicit in the Hippocratic Oath, the ancient codes of India and China, and in
the ethics of Thomas Percival that inspired the AMA's first and subsequent
codes.
6
Beneficence means acting on behalf of, in the interest of, or as an advocate
of the patient. It has always implied some degree of effacement of the physi-
cian's self-interest in favor of the interests of the patient. For centuries good
physicians have treated patients who could not pay, have exposed themselves
to contagion or physical harm in responding to the call of the sick, and have
sacrificed their leisure and time with their own families-sometimes too lib-
erally-all out of commitment to serve the good of the sick.
Indeed, it is the fact of this effacement of self-interest that distinguishes a
true profession from a business or craft.7 And it is the expectation that phy-
sicians will, by and large, practice some degree of self-effacement that war-
rants the trust that society and individual patients place in them. It is the
physician's public commitment to service beyond self-interest that consti-
tutes the real entry of the medical graduate into the profession. The award-
ing of a medical degree only signifies successful completion of a course of
study; but the Oath is a public act of commitment to a special way of life
demanded by the nature of medicine and the special obligations that bind
those who enter it.8
Ethical commitments can, and do, mitigate the conflicts of interest inher-
ent in medical practice, but they do not eliminate them---except perhaps in
the heroic examples of self-sacrifice we expect only of saints and martyrs.
Surely the salaried physician is not free of this impediment. If his financial
incentives are reduced, other motives can conflict with the care owed the
patient-i.e., prestige, power, professional advancement, self-indulgence,
6. E.D. PELLIGRINO & D. THOMASMA, THE GOOD OF THE PATIENT, (forthcoming). In
this book, Thomasma and I unpack the notion of patient good, to examine its components and
the order of their moral importance.
7. H. CUSHING, iCONSECRATIO MEDICI AND OTHER PAPERS 3-13 (1929). See also, Pel-
legrino, What is a Profession? 12 J. ALLIED HEALTH, 168-76 (1983).
8. The Hippocratic Oath is still the most common public declaration of voluntary as-
sumption of ethical obligations inherent in medicine. Other oaths like the so-called Oath of
Maimonides, the Oath of Geneva, World Health Organization, etc. all carry the same message
of commitment to the good of others. This is true of the Oath of the Soviet Physicians as well,
with one significant difference I shall comment upon later.
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unionization, or family obligations. These can be just as detrimental to the
patient's well-being as the physician's monetary interests.
While there has always been some irreducible quantum of self-interest in
medicine, rarely, if ever, has self-interest been socially sanctioned, morally
legitimated, or, encouraged as it is in the rationing approach to cost contain-
ment. Today, the physician's self-interest is deliberately used by policymak-
ers to contain the availability, accessibility and quality of services to the
patient. It is against this background of how they accentuate the de facto
conflict of interest in medicine that the several forms of "gatekeeping," licit
and illicit, must be examined.
III. THREE FORMS OF "GATEKEEPING"
a De Facto "Gatekeeping": The Traditional Role
As with de facto conflict of interest, there is in the nature of the medical
transaction, an unavoidable gatekeeping function which the physician has
always exercised and, indeed, is under compulsion to exercise in a morally
defensible way. The unavoidable fact is that the physician recommends
what tests, treatments, medications, operations, consultations, periods of
hospitalization, or nursing homes the patient needs. Currently, the fact is
that the physician monitors the flow of seventy-five percent of today's health
and medical care expenditures.
This fact imposes a serious positive moral obligation on the physician to
use both the individual and society's resources optimally. In the case of the
individual patient, the physician has the obligation, inherent in his promise
to act for the patient's welfare, to use only those measures appropriate to the
cure of his patient or alleviation of his suffering. What the physician recom-
mends must be effective-that is, it must materially modify the natural his-
tory of the disease, and it must also be beneficial; that is, it must be to the
patient's benefit. Some measures are highly effective-like treatments for
pneumonia-but may not be always beneficial if they prolong unnecessarily
the act of dying and thus impose the burden of futility and expense without
benefit for the patient. There are also treatments that benefit the patient but
are not effective in altering the course of the disease-pain relief, nursing or
home care, for example.
The same applies to diagnostic procedures. The physician has a moral
obligation to use laboratory tests, X-rays, and imaging procedures, only if
they contribute materially to the certitude of the diagnosis or the nature of
the clinical decision. Marginally helpful tests, especially if they are expen-
sive, or tests that are simply for teaching purposes (if the patient is in a
teaching hospital) are not justifiable.
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The physician, therefore, has a legitimate, indeed, a morally binding re-
sponsibility to function as a "gatekeeper." He must use his knowledge to
practice competent, scientifically rational medicine. His guidelines should
be a diagnostic elegance-just the right degree of economy of means in diag-
nosis--and therapeutic parsimony-just those treatments that are demon-
strably beneficial and effective. In this way, the physician automatically
fulfills several moral obligations: he avoids unnecessary risk to the patient
from dubious treatment and he conserves the patient's financial resources
and society's as well.
The physician remains the patient's advocate. As the de facto gatekeeper,
the physician is obliged to obtain tests and use treatments that are beneficial
to his patient and not to restrict access purely for financial or economic rea-
sons. The physician may withhold treatment if the patient decides that he
does not wish to consume his family's resources. Thus, limiting access can
be part of a legitimate gatekeeper role.
The role of defacto gatekeeper, when ethically performed, entails no con-
flict with the patient's good. Economics and ethics, individual and social
good, and the doctor's and the patient's interests are all in congruence. In
rational medicine, as I have defined it, the mode of the payment-whether
by salary or fee-should make no difference. Properly conceived and prac-
ticed, rational medicine in a sense solves the dilemma posed in the First
Book of the Republic. It subjects both the physician's art as physician and as
wage earner to a higher standard-the standard of rational medicine, and
that, in turn, derives its justification from the fact that it is in the patient's
best interests. In the morally defensible gatekeeper role, the physician uses
his defacto position to advance the good of his patient. In contrast, two new
versions of gatekeeping have been introduced, each with serious moral objec-
tion because their primary intent is economic, not ethical obligation.
b. The Negative Gatekeeper Role
In the "negative" version of the gatekeeper role, the physician is placed
under constraints of self-interest to restrict the use of medical services of all
kinds but particularly those that are most expensive. A variety of measures
is used, each of which interjects economic considerations into the physician's
clinical decisions and limits his discretionary latitude in making decisions.
One way to do this is through the Diagnostic Related Group (DRG) pro-
gram which assigns, in advance, to some 400 odd disease categories, a fixed
sum or number of days of hospitalization. If the number of days (or tests,
procedures, etc.) is exceeded, the institution, or the physician, "loses" the
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difference; if the number of days of hospitalization (or procedures) is less
than the allotted, then the institution or physician makes a "profit."
In other plans, the physician or institution contracts to provide care for
some prescribed number of patients for a fixed annual sum. Again, if the
total costs of care exceed the contracted amount, the provider bears the loss;
if the costs are less, the provider makes a profit. Variations on these themes
are several. They need not be detailed here. The essence of each is to moti-
vate the provider to limit access to care by appealing to his self-interest.9
With all these plans, the physician becomes the focus of incentives and
disincentives: in his role as a private practitioner when he hospitalizes a
patient under the DRG system, and as the employee or partner in a prepay-
ment insurance plan, like a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO), In-
dependent Practice Association (IPA) or Primary Care Network (PCN).
Increasingly, in each case the physician's economic efficiency is monitored
and his deviations from the norm are rewarded or punished. The rewards
may be in the form of profit-sharing, bonuses, promotion in the organization,
or other perquisites and preferments. The disincentives are loss of profit,
limits on admitting privileges, or non-renewal of co-employment contracts.
In some instances, productivity and efficiency schedules, "pass through" cri-
teria, and other quantitative measures, not only of cost-containment but of
profit-making, are used to evaluate the physician's performance.
The major pressure in these plans at present is upon the primary care
physician, the first contact member of the health care system who makes the
majority of decisions about entry into the system. The primary care physi-
cian may be the family primary practitioner, general internist, or pediatri-
cian. The primary physician as the "man in the trenches" has the greatest
influence over access to expensive resources of hospitalization, testing and
consulting. For this reason, many pre-payment plans insist that the patient
must stay with one primary care physician within the system lest he or she
shop around for one who might be more compliant. Gradually, as pressures
for cost-containment increase, the consultant and tertiary care specialists
will very likely also be included as gatekeepers with constraints and criteria
suited to the nature of their specialties.
9. Studies of the experiences with physician gatekeeping are beginning to appear. Sam-
ples of such studies are these: Eisenberg, The Internist as Gatekeeper, 102 ANNALS OF INTER-
NAL MED. 537-43 (1985); Somers, And Who Shall be the Gatekeeper? The Role of the
Physician in the Health Care Delivery System, 20 INQUIRY 301-13 (1983); Inglehart, Medicaid
Turns to Prepaid Managed Care, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 976-80 (1983); Moore, Cost Contain-
ment Through Risk Sharing by Primary Care Physicians, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1359-62
(1979).
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c. The Positive Gatekeeping Role
The "positive" version of gatekeeping is less well-defined and not usually
explicitly formalized. In this version, the physician is constrained to in-
crease rather than decrease access to services. The purpose here is not con-
taining costs but enhancing profits. For those who can pay, the latest and
most expensive diagnostic or therapeutic services are offered; services are
provided based on market "demand" rather than medical need. The aim is
to "penetrate" or "dominate" the market and to eliminate services that are
not profitable. Increasing the demand for services is an implicit goal. Here
the physician becomes virtually a salesman. We see this most blatantly al-
ready in the television and newspaper advertisements soliciting clients for
elective surgery and all sorts of services, some authentic and some quite
useless.
With the positive gatekeeper role, the physician uses his de facto position
as gatekeeper to his own financial advantage or that of his employer. He
shares in the profit directly if he is an owner of, or investor in, the service
provided or he is rewarded by pay increases and advancement, if he is
employed.
IV. THE MORAL ISSUES IN MEDICAL GATEKEEPING
a. Moral Issues in Negative Gatekeeping
Both the positive and negative versions of gatekeeping exploit the defacto
position of the physician as the filter through which patients gain access to
services. The purposes to be served are, however, not primarily in the pa-
tient's interests. The moral issues arise in the degree to which these other
interests dilute the trust the patient places in the physician as his primary
agent, minister and advocate. The motives of self-interest upon which the
newer gatekeeping roles depend complicate and accentuate the irreducible
quanta of self-interest that have always existed in the patient-physician
relationship.
Efforts at cost-containment are not, in themselves, immoral, and, as noted
above, are morally mandatory when in the best interests of the patient. They
violate those interests if, for whatever reason, they deny needed services or
induce the patient to demand, or the physician to provide, unneeded serv-
ices. The ethical dilemmas of gatekeeping therefore arise out of the way
economic incentives and disincentives modify the physician's freedom to act
in the patient's behalf. While in the past the physician was largely responsi-
ble for defining "necessary" and "unnecessary" care, those determinations
are now formularized by policy. In applying the formulae, the physician
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becomes the agent of the hospital or the system rather than the patient.
And, his medical criteria of necessary treatment are subject to modification
or veto by economic considerations.
Many of the ethical dilemmas are illustrated in the Medicare Prospective
Payment System now in force in the majority of states. In this system, the
cost-base per diem reimbursement system of the past is replaced by a Pro-
spective Payment System (PPS) based in fixed prices for 471 Diagnostic Re-
lated Groups. The initial motivation behind this transition was to improve
quality of care by linking quality of care directly to reimbursement. Thus it
was reasoned that the DRG system would cut costs by closer scrutiny of
care aimed especially at limiting "unnecessary" tests, drugs, procedures, and
hospitalization. Besides being economically wasteful, unneeded care is also
dangerous to patients.
These cost containment measures are not intrinsically immoral. Certainly
we cannot consider them unethical simply because they limit the physician's
latitude in decisionmaking. Rather it is the effect of this limitation on the
patient that is ethically crucial as is the moral responsibility of the physician
operating within such a system when he deems its impact to be harmful for
his patient.
The difficulty in the application of present DRG policies arises in the de-
termination of what is "necessary" for quality care for a particular patient.
In a system based on "average" lengths of stay for each disease, individual
patients may suffer since no two diseases manifest themselves in the same
way in every patient. As a result, disease entities are treated, not individual
patients, and the original aim of quality care is compromised, sometimes
dangerously.
For example, the needs for hospitalization, tests, and medical care for a
previously healthy, middle-aged head of household with a comfortable home
and a good job with a diagnosis of pneumonia, are very different from the
needs of the same disease in a chronically ill, elderly widow, living alone,
with her family at a distance. Given the variable nature of patient responses
to illness, a certain number of individual cases must fall outside the statisti-
cal projections. These are termed "outliers"-those who need lengthier
stays, more procedures, and medications, than the DRG plan allows.
Two tendencies deleterious to patients are already manifest in the way the
DRG system is being administered in many hospitals. One is the fact that
patients are being discharged "quicker and sicker." The second is the failure
to provide the extra funds needed by the "outlier." In both instances it is
often the frail, elderly patient who is sent "home" with no adequate provi-
sion for post-hospital care such as nursing home care or home care. In fact,
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the trend of public policy at the moment is to curtail payment for non-hospi-
tal and long-term care, further aggravating the harm done by premature
discharge.
In Prospective Payment Systems, the physician is automatically a "nega-
tive" gatekeeper. To the extent that there is greater scrutiny of the quality of
care rendered and unnecessary care avoided, the good of the patient is
served. But when the system harms the patient then the question of the
physician's primary agency arises. If he is primarily the patient's advocate,
agent and minister, then he must protect the patient's interests against the
system even at some risk and damage to his own self-interest.
In addition to the intrinsic difficulties of gatekeeping, the physician's judg-
ments are beclouded by a variety of pressures and motives inimical to the
patient's interests.'0 There is, first of all, the tendency toward underutiliza-
tion since this rewards the physician or hospital. The temptation, therefore,
is great to cut corners, to declare as "frills" what might otherwise be a neces-
sity, or to be less sensitive to the more subtle but equally important needs of
patients for psycho-social support. Further, the primary care physician is
encouraged to temporize in his work-up and to delay expensive tests, treat-
ments or consultations. He may even stretch his competence dangerously to
do certain procedures himself in order to contain costs.
Another pressure in prospective payment plans is to disfavor or disen-
franchise the sicker patients, those with chronic illness and those who need
the more expensive kinds of care. Less admirable still is the way cost-con-
tainment can be used consciously or unconsciously to justify the exclusion or
denial of services to difficult, troublesome, obnoxious or other categories of
patients one prefers not to see---the neurotic, the "complainers," the "hy-
pochondriacs"---or worst of all, the ethnic or social groups one dislikes
personally.
Another deleterious effect of negative gatekeeping is to cultivate competi-
tion among providers on the wrong grounds. Instead of competition to pro-
vide the highest quality care, as judged by the standards of rational
medicine, competition is for the best records of savings, productivity, effi-
ciency, the shortest hospital stays or the least number of procedures done.
Granted that excesses of care exist and are deleterious, it does not follow
10. Some of the tendencies, dangers and conflicts potentially harmful to patients and ethi-
cally suspect are discussed in the following: Rosenblatt & Moscovice, The Physician as Gate-
keeper, 22 MED. CARE 150-59 (Feb. 1984); Relman, The Allocation of Medical Resources by
Physicians, 55 J. MED. EDUC. 99-104 (1980); Moore, Martin & Richardson, Does the Primary
Gatekeeper Control the Costs of Health Care, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1400-04 (1983);
Overholt, The Socioeconomic and Political Future of Gastroenterology, Part II, Primary Care
Network 78 A. J. GASTROENTEROLOGY PART II, PRIMARY CARE NETWORK 457-60 (1983).
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that underutilization is beneficial especially with certain very effective,
though costly, kinds of high technology (e.g., renal dialysis, organ trans-
plant, coronary angioplasty, CAT scanning, NMR examinations).
To be effective many prospective payment plans insist that patients must
be locked into care by one primary care physician. The choice of physicians
and the freedom to switch is severely limited. The most sensitive part of the
healing relationship, the confidence one must have in one's personal physi-
cian, is thus ignored or compromised. Especially in chronic or recurrent
illness this confidence is essential to effective care.
These factors converge to drive the physician's self-interest into conflict
with the patient's. These conflicts are heightened by the rather drastic
changes occurring in the economic status of the medical profession which
make the physician more vulnerable to economic pressure. There is today
an oversupply of physicians in urban areas and in many specialties." Many
physicians now graduate with debts for their education in the neighborhood
of 100,000 dollars. The high cost of malpractice premiums must be laid out
before anyone dares risk even a day of medical practice. Competition from
corporately owned and operated clinics forces even conscientious physicians
into "survival" tactics of questionable, moral defensibility.
The result of all of this is that many young and even older physicians are
driven into salaried group practices and automatically become negative gate-
keepers. The physician's independence, as Paul Starr has shown, is rapidly
eroding, and with it, his ability to withstand the institutional and corporate
strictures of his judgment about what is good for his patient.' 2 It is becom-
ing ever more costly personally and financially for even the most morally
sensitive physician to practice the effacement of self-interest that medical
ethics requires.
b. Moral Issues in Positive Gatekeeping
The moral conflicts in the positive version of gatekeeping are less subtle
and more explicit. Here the profit motive is primary. The transaction be-
tween physician and patient becomes a commodity transaction. The physi-
cian becomes an independent entrepreneur or the hired agent of
entrepreneurs and investors who themselves have no connection with the
traditions of medical ethics. The physician begins to practice the ethics of
the marketplace, to think of his relationship with the patient, not as a cove-
11. Summary Report of the Graduate Medical Education National Advisory Committee to
the Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., Sept. 30, 1980.
12. P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 514 (1982).
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nant or trust, but as a business and a contract relationship. Ethics becomes
not a matter of obligations or virtue, but of legality. The metaphors of busi-
ness and law replace those of ethics. Medical knowledge becomes proprie-
tary; the doctor's private property to be sold to whom he chooses at
whatever price and conditions he chooses.
The dependence, anxiety, lack of knowledge and vulnerability of the sick
person are exploited for personal profit. To encourage unnecessary cosmetic
surgery, hysterectomy, CAT scans, or sonograms, even if the patient believes
he ought to have "the latest and the best," is to defect from even the most
primordial concept of stewardship of the patient's interests. Here the con-
flict of interest is more blatant than in the negative version of gatekeeping.
The patient becomes primarily a source of income. The crasser financial mo-
tives that have motivated selfish physicians are legitimated and even given
social sanction.
In the positive version of gatekeeping there is not, as there may be in the
negative version, any defensible moral argument. Some defend the profit
motive as necessary to medical progress, to maintain quality of service or
even charitable care. It would be unrealistic to deny that for some physi-
cians these are the only effective motives and that some good can come of
them. But ultimately the profit motive erodes the moral sensitivities and
standards of the profession. Ultimately when a conflict occurs between
profit and patient welfare, patient welfare is sure to suffer. The unrestrained
monetary instinct corrupts medicine as surely as the unrestrained instincts
for power or prestige.
V. SOME SOCIAL-ETHICAL CONCOMITANTS OF RATIONING
The negative and the positive gatekeeper roles both involve social conse-
quences of dubious moral probity. Both tolerate and, indeed, foster two or
more levels of quality, availability, and accessibility of health care. The af-
fluent person can buy whatever he needs or wants; he can supplement what a
DRG plan allows if he is an "outlier." The various prepayment plans and
organizations seek eagerly to enroll him. The less affluent and the poor have
no such access to care. They may or may not be assured of what is called an
"adequate" level of care. Adequacy is vaguely defined, but on closer exami-
nation, it will be inevitable that the differences between what rich and poor
can get will be significant. The poor and the lower economic strata of the
middle class are relegated to public hospitals which will have to be re-estab-
lished and, of course, financed.
The differences in the care provided in public and "private" hospitals ex-
tend beyond convenience, accomodations or "frills." Anyone whose experi-
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ence, like this author's, goes back to the large municipal hospitals of several
decades ago will recognize these differences. The efforts of the last two de-
cades to undo the injustices of a multi-level system of health care are being
reversed by the move to rationing, cost containment and gatekeeping.
A different kind of social-moral issue arises if we ask whether it is defensi-
ble for society to transpose its responsibility for rationing to the physician.
Are not the criteria for these decisions the responsibility of all of us? In
situations of extreme economic exigency, rationing could be justified. But
the criteria for rationing and the principle of justice to be followed should
rest with society, not the physician. There is no assurance that the physician
is any fairer or juster than others in deciding who shall receive so crucially
important a resource as health care. Do we as a society really want to give
this kind of power to physicians?
A very careful balance between the relative place of societally-determined
criteria for rationing and the latitude allowed physicians in making rationing
decisions must be struck. Society may wish to use the DRG mechanism as a
way of expressing its value choices, but should the physician accept such a
charge in the face of his prime duty to be the patient's advocate?
On grounds, therefore, of the conflict it generates between the physician's
and patient's interests and the social injustice it fosters, the role of gate-
keeper entails an erosion and a violation of the commitment to the patient's
welfare that must be the primary moral imperative in medical care. This
commitment flows from the nature of illness and the promise of service made
by individual physicians and the profession as a whole. That commitment
has a basis in the empirical nature of the healing relationship in which a sick
person-dependent, vulnerable, exploitable-must seek out the help of an-
other who has the knowledge, skill, and facilities needed to effect cure. It is
inevitably a relationship of inequality in freedom and power in which the
stronger is obliged to protect the interest of the weaker.13
VI. SOME COUNTER ARGUMENTS
Some would argue that the moral issues raised against gatekeeping, ration-
ing and for-profit medicine on grounds of conflicts of interest and divided
loyalties, are specious. The opposing viewpoints are several: medical care
has always been rationed; differences in availability, accessibility and quality
have always existed and always will; even the so-called not-for-profit hospi-
tals make an "excess" of revenues over expenditures. Moreover, the doctor's
fee is itself a "profit" and a source of conflict of interest. And even if this
13. Pellegrino, Toward a Reconstruction of Medical Morality: The Primacy of the Act of
Profession and the Fact of Illness, 4 J. MED & PHIL. 32-56 (1979).
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were not true, rationing and fiscal motivations are essential to fiscal survival.
Even religiously-sponsored institutions argue that they must make a profit
and must ration care on the ability to pay. "No margin, no mission," they
say. Survival, it is argued, demands practices that may be distasteful and
unfair, but not unjust.
I would counter these arguments as follows: first of all the existence of
inequity and injustice does not give them any necessary moral sanction, nor
does the fact that all injustice cannot be eliminated in an imperfect world. If
we cannot afford all the health care people want or need, there are alterna-
tive ways of rationing or allocating resources more morally valid than those
now in use.
Second, there is a real difference between the way a for-profit and a not-
for-profit institution handles the "excess" of revenue over expenditures. In a
for-profit (or more decorously called "investor-owned") hospital, the pri-
mary aim is profit because the prime obligation is to protect and enlarge the
investor's shares. This, it must be added, is a moral obligation since the for-
profit hospital is steward of other people's money. The "profit," however,
goes into the pockets of the investors, while in a non-profit hospital most of
it must go into the improvement of patient care services or capital expansion.
When the physician is gatekeeper in a for-profit hospital, he has conflicting
obligations-to the investor and to the patient.
Proponents of rationing point to the over-utilization of services, ineffi-
ciency of management and operation and the lack of stimulus for innovative
models of care that admittedly beset cost-reimbursement and government
entitlement programs. One cannot defend these shortcomings, nor argue for
a "blank check" approach to health care. Both must be eliminated in any
defensible system of health care payment. But the fact is that the various
cost-containment systems now being used have yet to achieve greater effi-
ciency than not-for-profit systems.' 4 Indeed, it appears that in the for-profit
systems, gatekeeping has resulted in no cost advantage over not-for-profit
systems while the charges are higher (sometimes by as much as twenty-five
percent). Thus, successful cost containment, the major moral justification
for gatekeeping, is questionable: prices are not appreciably lower. Yet, to-
day, fewer people have adequate coverage and more are forced to deplete
their financial reserves to pay for needed medical care.
Some would argue that we have in the PSRO mechanism all the controls
we need to prevent abuses of the prepayment systems. Professional Stan-
dards Review Organizations [PSRO] were established in every state to moni-
14. Catlin, Bradbury, & Catlin, Primary Care Gatekeepers in HMO's, 17 J. FAM. PRAC.
673-78 (1983).
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tor the quality and costs of services provided under Medicare. They are peer
review organizations composed of physicians whose function is to assure
quality of care and containment of costs by avoidance of unnecessary proce-
dures. Because of concerns about the efficiency and assiduity of their polic-
ing of physician performance, they were re-organized last year by Congress.
Since then the number of disciplinary actions has notably increased.
It is an essential moral duty of physicians as individuals and as members
of these PSROs to monitor, correct, and discipline abuses by doctors and
hospitals. PSROs should obviously be employed as effectively as possible.
But PSROs do not solve the ethical dilemmas of gatekeeping. What they
should assure is that the de facto gatekeeping functions are carried out and
rational and honest medicine is practiced.' 5 PSROs cannot eradicate the
dilemmas created for the conscientious doctor by a national policy of
rationing.
For the dishonest or incompetent physician, the ethical dilemmas outlined
are inconsequential. It is the physician committed to the good of his patient,
the one who practices rational medicine for whom divided loyalties are a
genuine ethical problem. For such a physician, even the PSRO might pose
an ethical dilemma, i.e., when peer reviewers censure him for failing to apply
the cost containment measures if he sincerely believes doing so will serve his
patient. Effective PSROs are essential to good care. It is the ethical implica-
tions of the health policies under which they operate that must be subjected
to critical scrutiny.
VII. Is RATIONING INEVITABLE?
The only argument with some moral substance for rationing is economic
necessity. Some fear that rising health care costs will seriously compromise
availability and accessibility of other good things our society needs to
thrive-nutrition, housing, jobs, or national security. This is the justification
for efforts to put some arbitrary ceiling on the percentage of Gross National
Product dedicated to health care. Is the assumption of national bankruptcy
by health care costs true? If it is, rationing might be justified. Then the
moral question becomes, under what conditions? If it is not, then rationing
has no moral sanction.
The question turns on the validity of the initial premise of the line of rea-
soning that leads to rationing as inevitable. This is a difficult question to
answer because comparable figures on national expenditures for other things
society wants are hard to come by. Moreover, whether there is a crisis or
15. Dans, Weiner & Otter, Peer Review Organizations, Promises and Potential Pitfalls, 313
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1131-37 (1985).
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not depends very much on the value we place on other expenditures. Some
of the data on health care costs that policymakers find distressing are these:
The nation's total health care bill has now exceeded one billion dollars per
day in the United States. The percentage of our Gross National Product
going into health care is higher than almost any other nation's and is going
higher each year. Two and a half billion dollars is spent on keeping 70,000
patients with chronic renal disease alive; 4.4 billion is spent in heart and liver
transplants; ten percent of all operating costs of a university hospital goes
into the last three to six months of life; eighty percent of those who die do so
in a hospital as compared with fifty percent in 1949 and much lower percent-
ages at the turn of the century; 230,000 babies are born each year weighing
less than 2,500 grams, half of them survive; fifteen percent of those who
survive end up with some residual defect; two billion dollars per year are
spent on neonatal intensive care units.
Each of these and other figures has been selected by some protagonist of
rationing as the place to economize. Rationing for these groups is proposed
on utilitarian, economic and humanitarian grounds, i.e., to reduce the
number of dependent, non-productive members of society, or save money for
other socially useful purposes or needs, or to prevent dooming the retarded
and the disabled to lives of poor "quality." Some suggest that persons over a
certain age should not be offered dialysis, that high technology procedures
like liver and heart transplants or even coronary by-passes should not be
performed, that research in high technology treatments like artificial hearts
be halted, that babies under a certain cut-off weight should not be treated,
that there should be a monetary limit on the expenditures for persons with
terminal illnesses in the last few months of life, and that those above a cer-
tain age should not be treated vigorously.
These proposals deserve more critical examination than is possible here.
They illustrate a range of policy options, all of which center on rationing of
expensive forms of care. Against these expenditures we must consider ex-
penditures for the following which, as a nation, we make willingly-indeed,
sometimes avidly: Forty billion for alcohol, thirty billion for tobacco, sixty-
five billion for cosmetics, sixty-five billion for advertising, unspecified billions
for recreation hand guns, illicit drugs, gambling, or various types of
luxuries.
16
What decisions would we make if we consciously compared these expendi-
tures against those for health care? Is 2.5 billion dollars too much to spend
16. Figures for national expenditures for goods, commodities and services are difficult to
evaluate. For our purposes the important point is the relative order of magnitude of specific
health and medical care expenditures as compared with other expenditures.
19 86]
38 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 2:23
on keeping 70,000 people with renal disease alive-many of them in active
lives-or four billion to return people to active life by means of cardiac,
liver, or renal transplants which are becoming more effective each year?
What about the fifty percent of underweight babies who do survive and the
eighty-five percent who are not disabled or retarded? Can we decide what is
"quality" life for another person and especially for an infant whose values
cannot possibly be known? How do we distinguish between futile and bur-
densome treatment and effective, though expensive, life-saving treatments?
How do we protect the vulnerable-the old, the very young, the poor, and
the socially outcast-from being discriminated against in rationing deci-
sions? How do we know when research into high technology may turn out
to be beneficial for all, rather than a few?
How would we answer these questions if we considered health a higher
value than some of the other things for which we make great expenditures
without questioning them at all? Would we have to ask these questions at all
if we could cut out truly unnecessary care, reduce inefficiencies of the care
we now give, and establish some priority among the categories of care based
on their need, benefit and effectiveness as seen from the patient's point of
view.
If we address these questions in an orderly way, identifying the underlying
values and making conscious choices, we might decide that rationing and
life-boat ethics are not warranted in this country today. It would take more
space than this essay permits to establish these contentions. The questions
have yet to be examined carefully, particularly to expose their underlying
value desiderata. This is a sensitive operation and one whose conclusions
might prove embarrassing. How we make the choices rationing implies will
reveal more about the kind of people we are, and want to be than it would
about those we might wish to confront.
VIII. THE CONDITIONS FOR MORALLY LICIT RATIONING
Let us assume that there is a true economic crisis, that health care needs
are, indeed, eroding society's capacity to obtain other needed goods-hous-
ing, jobs, food, security-and that we have consciously come to the conclu-
sions that rationing and life-boat ethics are necessary on moral grounds.
Under these conditions, we must face opposing moral obligations: to pro-
vide health care and at the same time to protect the fabric of society. Such
conditions exist in times of natural disaster, war, epidemics and the like.
Under those conditions, rationing of health and many other things is ac-
cepted. But even under less urgent conditions, morally valid criteria can be
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established for both allocation and rationing of national resources dedicated
to health and medical care. A tentative set of criteria might be the following:
First of all, all alternate measures to rationing should have been ex-
hausted. We are far from such a goal. To attain it, we would have to assure
the following at least:
a) The efficiency of management of personnel, facilities and fiscal re-
sources are optimal. This is not the place to detail how the necessary meas-
ures are to be employed. Suffice it to say that economies have been and can
still be made in this area. They must be made first if rationing is to be justi-
fied as a national policy.
b) Rational medicine, defined above as consisting of diagnostic elegance
and therapeutic parsimony, would have to be practiced universally and opti-
mally. The elimination of unnecessary tests would save in the range of fif-
teen to twenty billion dollars per year. An even larger sum could be saved
by the elimination of truly unnecessary surgery, medications and other ther-
apeutic procedures. An estimate of this figure is difficult to obtain since
much depends on the definition of "unnecessary."'
17
c) Some hierarchy of services would have to be established to govern the
priority assigned to various kinds of health care expenditures. To be morally
valid this hierarchy must be ordered from the patient's point of view accord-
ing to benefit, effectiveness, and need. One possible way to order such a
hierarchy might be as follows:
1) Highly effective preventive measures for disease of wide distribution,
e.g., immunization for small pox, tetanus, diptheria, pertosis, and polio
might come first.
2) Then could follow beneficial and effective treatments for life-threaten-
ing disease: for example, emergency trauma care, renal dialysis, angioplasty
in impending myocardial infarction, or radiation and chemotherapy for re-
sponsive neoplastic diseases.
3) Following this, the next category might be beneficial and effective
treatment for less acute but serious diseases--coronary by-pass surgery for
intractable angina pectoris, disabling hernia, drug treatment for gout, peptic
ulcer, or hypertension.
4) Less urgent would be expenditures for expensive treatments with mar-
ginal benefit like coronary by-pass when medical treatment is equally effec-
17. See Rutkow, Unnecessary Surgery: What is it? 62 SURGICAL CLINICIAN N. AM. 613-
25 (1982); Rutkow, Rates of Surgery in the United States: the Decade of the 1970s, 62 SURGI-
CAL CLINICIAN N. AM. 781-91 (1982); Study on Surgical Services for the United States, AMER-
ICAN COLLEGE OF SURGEONS, AMERICAN SURGICAL ASSOCIATION (1975).
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tive, carotid endarterectomy of certain types, .and preventive
cholecystectomy for cholelithiasis.
5) Last would be effective treatment for non-disabling, non- life-threaten-
ing disorders-purely cosmetic surgery.
This is a list that is obviously a subject for vigorous debate as to content
and priority. My point is not to make a brief for this particular list but only
to suggest that establishing such a hierarchy is one precondition to morally
licit rationing.
A similar hierarchical listing would have to be developed for diagnostic
procedures as well. Many of these are expensive, and add only marginally to
diagnostic accuracy. With diagnosis, as with treatment, the latest is not al-
ways the best. The additional benefit or effectiveness may not be sufficient to
warrant the added expense.
We must be reminded that there are many acceptable ways to manage
patients which do not necessarily involve the most sophisticated technolo-
gies. Some of these, indeed, may even be preferable since they may be less
risky than the latest procedures. Tests done solely in the interests of "defen-
sive medicine" to forestall litigation would have to be eliminated. Despite
the physician's understandable fear of malpractice suits, he cannot morally
justify the costs or risk of unnecessary procedures simply to protect himself.
Assuming that the above and other measures to contain costs have been
utilized fully, the next condition for morally licit rationing is the open public
disclosure of the categories of care that will be rationed together with the
principles upon which they will be rationed. Selection of a morally defensi-
ble rationing principle is another difficult but unavoidable condition of a
morally defensible rationing system.
Shall the principle be equity of access for all, or age, social worth, merit,
ability to pay or lottery? Arguments have been marshalled to defend one or
another principle of distributive justice. Again, we cannot examine each
principle critically here. 8 I wish simply to establish the need for settling on
some explicit principle. Once established, that principle must be made
known to all. As it is, a variety of principles is in use and rarely is any
explicitly stated. Again, the principle we select will tell much about our
most cherished values and the kind of society we wish to be and whether we
regard health as a human right, an obligation on society or simply as another
commodity.
Especially crucial with respect to the gatekeeper role is that the hierarchy
18. Debates about the nature of justice and the principles of distributive justice that
should obtain are particularly active today. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); R.
NOZICK, STATE, ANARCHY AND UTOPIA (1974).
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of services and the principle of rationing must be determined in public policy
and made known to all who seek care. It is not left up to the physician to
determine in individual cases who lives or dies, who gets care, and who does
not. In this way, the physician can remain the primary advocate of the pa-
tient, albeit within constraints imposed by social or public policy.
The physician may disagree with those constraints when he feels they are
injurious to patients-his own or others. When he does so, he has a moral
obligation to use the means available in a democratic society to change poli-
cies, regulations, or procedures that violate his perception of what is good
for patients. He can function with moral integrity in the "valid," de facto
gatekeeping role described above. In that role, he serves his patient's inter-
ests, not his own, or those of the institution or corporation providing health
care services.
But the invalid roles of negative and positive gatekeeper, as defined in this
article, require the physician to dilute his primary advocacy of his patient's
interest. Society should not force or encourage physicians to be double or
triple agents. It is not morally defensible for society to "unload" its unpleas-
ant rationing decisions on physicians. Nor can it run the risk of physician
bias or prejudice in the way resources are rationed in individual cases. Pa-
tients who are denied some needed care must recognize that it is the whole of
society that has denied them and under constraints that apply to everyone.
Physicians are free to protest unjust measures and to educate public and
policymakers to the dangers of their own rationing decisions. As a conse-
quence, the covenant of beneficience between physician and patient is pre-
served. The one who is ill need not fear that his physician is acting as a
hidden double or triple agent. The physician on his part is under serious
obligation to protect his patient's interests within the constraints imposed by
health policies, but also moally obliged to oppose and resist such policies
when they prove injurious to his patients.
It is possible that our society will choose other things over health, that it
will see health care as nothing more than a commodity or service like any
other, and that it will impose the responsibility of specific rationing decisions
on physicians. If this occurs, then it is a moral requirement that physicians
publicly acknowledge the difference this will drastically make in the expecta-
tions the patient brings to his relationship with a doctor. The profession
must signal the change the gatekeeper role entails for the transformation of
medical ethics from primary concern for the individual patients to a compet-
ing conern for social or economic good. Were we to take this direction in
medical ethics, we would be moving in the direction of the code of the Soviet
physician which makes the good of the polity and society the prime principle
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of medical ethics. Beneficence, patient autonomy, and justice-the corner-
stones of professional medical ethics today-would have to yield to social
good and economic need.
IX. SOME LEGAL QUESTIONS
Neither the profession, nor the public, can have it both ways: either the
physician serves primarily the interests of the patient or the physician be-
comes the instrument of social and fiscal policy as well as patient good.
We cannot predict how the American people will ultimately resolve the
serious ethical dilemmas of gatekeeping and whether they are prepared to
accept the ethical conflicts of divided loyalty. There is, however, some indi-
cation that the public may not be ready to abandon its moral expectation
that the physician is the patient's primary agent. This is reflected in the
potentials for litigation in which patients may hold physicians liable for
harm done to them by premature discharge from the hospital, or the omis-
sion of tests, or treatment or failure to hospitalize under DRG and other cost
containment prepayment plans.
One distressing legal development is the possibility that standards of care
to which physicians are held will be downgraded to accommodate the kinds
of decisions prospective payment will require. This possibility is already be-
ing discussed tentatively in the legal profession. The presumption is that
standards can be lowered without loss of safety and that the public will ac-
cept "Chevrolet" in place of "Cadillac" care as long as it costs less.9
These assumptions are dangerous and invalid. They presume that lower-
ing standards will mean simply eliminating "unnecessary" care or the
"frills" and luxuries. Unfortunately, such distinctions are very hard to make
since the differences between present and proposed standards are not all that
trivial. It is very questionable whether such a move would decrease the pos-
sibility of suit or whether the doctor could be freed of his first duty to protect
the patient. Moreover, there is very little likelihood that the American pub-
lic would accept the implications of a lowered standard were it to be openly
19. Most of the litigation is still in the "possible" state being underlined by lawyers in
informal opinions that are probably well grounded. See, e.g., Chenen, Prospective Payment: It
Can Put You in Court, MED. ECON. 3, 134ff (July 9, 1984); Ginsburg, DRGs: Must Physicians
and Hospitals be Adversaries? 1985 PHYS. MED. 252; Gerber, How DRG's Increase Your Mal-
practice Risk, 1985 PHY. MED. (335). See also Curran, Economic and Legal Considerations in
Emergency Care for Analysis of the Case of Thompson v. Sun City Community Hospital, 312
NEw ENG. J. MED. 374-75 (1985). In this case a young boy needing emergency surgery was
transferred for financial reasons in a "stable" state. Suit was brought by patient's mother
against the hospital and the emergency room physician for permanent impairment resulting
from delay in surgery. The court found against the hospital but not the physician. More cases
of this type surely can be anticipated and liability of physicians will be questioned in each.
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announced. When it comes to health care, very few people are willing to
compromise their own safety.
Already, in anticipation of suits, hospitals are seeking to avoid litigation.
This is a legitimate move but it is more important still to act out of motives
of ethical obligation than self-protection. Fear of litigation is not a self-justi-
fying principle anymore than economic constraint.
Does the patient have a legal right to know in advance that a clinical
decision has been made on economic rather than strictly medical grounds?
Is the doctor to be held responsible for damage resulting from adherence to a
national health care policy? Or is he liable if he does not violate such a
policy when it has the potential to harm his patient? What penalty does he
suffer for placing loyalty to patient above loyalty to public or fiscal policy?
Is it morally defensible for society to put the physician in the midst of such
ethical and legal dilemmas?
Must informed consent in the future include full disclosure of the fact that
economic or social criteria will be used to modify judgments made on scien-
tific criteria or patient need? Will living wills have to take account of that
fact and direct physicians to use economic criteria in deciding on starting
and stopping life support or other measures? These and other legal issues
impinge upon and complicate the ethical dilemmas described in the various
types of gatekeeper roles now being assigned to physicians. Intensive exami-
nation of the legal issues and the provision of appropriate legal safeguards
for both the patient and the physician must be devised if we, as a nation, go
the route of rationing in toto, or even in part, as prepayment plans already in
existence require.
This examination has already been precipitated by litigation surrounding
one of the most common practices associated with prepayment and for-profit
plans and for institutions worried about deficits: the practice of "economic
transfer." 0 When a patient presents himself for admission, his insurance
coverage and ability to pay are assessed along with his medical condition. If
the patient seems an economic risk, he is transferred to a public or relig-
iously sponsored institution. These transfers are made when the patient is
presumed to be in a "stable" condition. However, the definition of stability
varies considerably from physician to physician and patients have suffered
physical damage as a result, to say nothing of emotional trauma. It is a fact
that the definition of stable state is altered by economic considerations when
a physician is an employee of an institution or a member of the resident staff.
The conflict of interest here is obvious and explicit. The primary moral
responsibility of the physician is clearly to the patient. He puts himself at
20. See supra note 19.
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considerable risk when he approves an economic transfer, legal as well as
moral. Once again we observe the paradox of an economic and market sys-
tem exploiting the physician's self-interest and the public's expectation that
the physician must act in the patient's best interests.
X. RECAPITULATION
The physician is responsible for seventy-five percent of the nation's ex-
penditures for health care. He is the "gatekeeper" who can limit or facilitate
access to tests, treatments, consultations, and admission to a variety of
health care institutions.
There are three ways in which the physician can function as gatekeeper:
one is morally mandatory, one is morally questionable, and one is morally
indefensible. The first is the traditional, or de facto function, which imposes
a responsibility to practice rational medicine, i.e., to use only those diagnos-
tic and therapeutic modalities beneficial and effective for the patient. The
proper exercise of traditional gatekeeping is not only morally imperative but
economically sound.
The second form of gatekeeping is the negative gatekeeping role, usually
within some form of prepayment system in which the physician strives to
limit the use of health care services. This role is morally dubious because it
generates a conflict between the responsibilities of the physician as a primary
advocate of the patient and as guardian of society's resources. Under certain
carefully defined conditions of economic necessity and moral monitoring, a
negative gatekeeping role might be morally justifiable.
The third form of gatekeeping is positive gatekeeping in which the physi-
cian encourages the use of health care facilities and services for personal or
corporate profit. This is an indefensible form of gatekeeping. No moral jus-
tification can be mustered in its favor.
Recognition of the ethical dilemmas created by the growing national belief
that health care rationing is inevitable, their impact on the care of patients
and the ethics of the physician-patient relationship are matters of wide pub-
lic concern. There are also emerging legal issues of significance.
This article delineates the nature of the ethical dilemmas of gatekeeping
from the viewpoint of the patient's interests. It concludes that the integrity
of the physician's primary responsibility to his patient is something society
must preserve, that rationing may not be as inevitable as generally supposed
and that before we can impose rationing on morally valid grounds, all other
means of cost containment must be exhausted.
No servant can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one,
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and love the other, or else he will hold to the one and despise the
other. You cannot serve God and mammon. Luke, 16:13.

